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The East China Sea in DOD China Military Power Reports
Bert Chapman*1
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 saw Congress require the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to prepare an annual report on Chinese military 
power. This report contains classified and unclassified editions. Documenting 
Chinese military developments, strategy, and trends are critical parts of these 
reports. Beijing’s military activities in the East China Sea (ECS) are important 
report components. This work explains the importance of these and other DOD 
reports for those studying ECS developments, examines how DOD has documented 
Beijing’s military activities within these publicly accessible reports, and describes 
how members of Congress have reacted to ECS developments during the Obama 
Administration.
Keywords: East China Sea, geopolitics, China, Japan, Taiwan, United States, 
territorial claims, maritime claims, U.S. Department of Defense information 
resources
Introduction
Each year Congress enacts annual appropriations legislation for 12 agency groups 
with the Department of Defense (DOD) being one of the agencies that are part of this 
legislation. Besides providing funding levels and setting out various legal requirements 
that mandate the agencies to prepare various reports on issues within the policymaking, 
purview of these agencies is subject to congressional funding and oversight. On October 
5, 1999, Congress enacted the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act 
with Section 1202 of this report mandating DOD prepare classified and unclassified 
reports on Chinese military power for the House and Senate Armed Services and 
Foreign Relations Committees. These reports document how Chinese military and 
technological developments may affect Beijing’s grand strategy, security strategy, 
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military organizations, and operational concepts. This article examines how these annual 
DOD reports and analogous publications have documented Beijing’s East China Sea 
(ECS) military activities during the Obama Administration with coverage of Chinese 
activity increasing during this administration’s tenure.1 
Annual Chinese Military Power Reports
The 2009 edition of this report noted that Japan maintains both it and China should 
retain an equidistant line from each country, which should distinguish their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) with China claiming an Exclusive Continental Shelf beyond 
the Okinawa Trench which nearly reaches Japan’s shore. In June 2008, China and Japan 
signed an agreement temporarily shelving the EEZ dispute while agreeing to jointly 
develop the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. The potential natural resource contentiousness 
of the ECS is heightened by its estimated reserves of approximately seven trillion 
cubic feet of gas and nearly 100 billion barrels of oil. Both Beijing and Tokyo dispute 
possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with two Chinese warships having sailed in 
waters adjacent to these islands in December 2008, but withdrawing after an official 
Japanese protest. This document also contended that ECS maritime claim disagreements 
with Japan could produce renewed tensions and a regional crisis.2
The following year saw continued emphasis placed on the ECS as an area of 
territorial disputes between China and Japan with both of these countries claiming that 
their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu would not undermine their bilateral relationship. 
This 2010 report also noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA’s) three main 
missions include: restricting seaborne aggression, protecting national sovereignty, 
and safeguarding maritime rights. It also noted that PLA Navy (PLAN) Doctrine 
incorporated six offensive and defensive capabilities including blockade, anti-sea lines 
of communication, maritime-land attack, anti-ship, maritime transportation protection, 
and naval base defense. DOD’s report also stressed that Chinese government and 
military writings stress Chinese economic and military power depends on being able to 
access and use the ECS and other seas; the need for a strong navy to ensure such access; 
and that the PLAN’s focus includes preparing for operations within the first and second 
island chains emphasizing potential conflict with U.S. forces over Taiwan.3      
The 2011 edition noted the September 2010 collision of a People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)-flagged fishing boat with Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands 
and how this triggered tensions between Beijing and Tokyo, and how the ECS, along 
with the South China Sea (SCS) and Yellow Sea, are part of the PLAN’s offshore 
defense aspirations in the First Island Chain. This report also observed that China seeks 
to enforce its expansive maritime claims with multiple civilian entities including the 
maritime police, Border Control Department, Maritime Safety Administration, State 
Oceanographic Administration, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and Coast 
Guard. DOD observed that China probably believes that using military assets to assert 
its claims increases chances of escalation, enhances regional animosity, and places 



























Figure 1. China’s First and Second Island Chains
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
excessive non-military burdens on the PLAN. DOD also contended that Beijing’s civil 
maritime agencies are poorly equipped and operated but are steadily improving and will 
become increasingly important in China’s maritime enforcement efforts.4
This report’s 2012 edition stressed how the PLA had deployed between 1,000–1,200 
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) against Taiwan and enhanced the lethality of this 
SRBM arsenal with improved ranges, accuracy, and payloads and listed the following 
cross-straits capabilities of China’s East and South China Sea fleets and the Taiwanese 
fleet.
It also noted that the majority of Chinese military aircraft are based in China’s east; that 
490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling; and 
that this number could increase significantly through combinations or aircraft forward 
deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles. The following chart 
of the Nanjing Military Region adjacent to the ECS demonstrates significant military 
capabilities encompassing air, land, and naval forces with amphibious, armor, artillery, 
bomber, destroyer, fighter, missile, submarine, and surface to air missile (SAM) assets 
which could be used in potential military operations against Japanese, Taiwanese, or U.S. 
forces coming to assist Tokyo and Taipei.7
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Table 1. Pre-2013 China Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies
Agency Ministry/Department Primary Mission/Ships
China Marine Surveillance State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
Law enforcement within 
PRC territorial waters; 
exclusive economic zones and 
shores; protecting maritime 
environment; natural resources; 
navigation aids and other 
facilities; and carrying out 
maritime surveys. Ship names: 
Haijian; 1,000 tons: 38; 36 
1,000-ton ships to be built in 
12th Five-Year Program. Total: 
400
Maritime Safety Administration Ministry of Transportation
Maritime traffic safety, 
coordinating maritime search 
and rescue in territorial waters. 
Ship names: Haishi or Haixun 
1,000 tons: 4. Total: 800+





Law enforcement concerning 
fishing and maritime resources 
and territorial waters and EEZ; 
protecting Chinese fishing 
vessels and personnel, resolving 
fishing activity disputes, 
preventing illegal fishing, and 
protecting maritime resources. 
Ship names: Yuzheng 1,000 
tons: 11; Under construction: 
13 1,000 ton ships and 12 3,000 
ton ships. Total: 150+
China Public Security Control 
Maritime Police (or Coast Guard)
Ministry of Public Security 
People’s Armed Police
Maritime security and fighting 
crime at sea. Ship names: 
Jaijing 1,000 tons: 3. Total: 480
China Customs Anti-Smuggling 
Police
General Administration of 
Customs
Maritime anti-smuggling. Ship 
names: Haiguan 1,000 tons: 3. 
Total: 212+.5
The report’s 2013 edition reiterated Chinese claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands; the September 2012 Japanese purchase of three of these islands from 
a private owner; and China protesting this move and regularly sending maritime law 
enforcement ships and occasionally aircraft to patrol near these islands as close as 
12 nautical miles. On September 25, 2012 China published the white paper “Diaoyu 
Dao: An Inherent Territory of China”, while also using improperly drawn straight line 
baseline claims inconsistent with international law. December 2012 also saw Beijing 
submit information to the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
regarding China’s extended ECS continental shelf including these islands.8
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Table 2. Cross-straits capabilities of China’s East and South China Sea fleets and the Taiwanese fleet
East and South China Sea Fleets Taiwan
Destroyers 16 4
Frigates 44 22
Tank Landing Ships/Amphibious Transport Dock 26 12
Medium Ships 18 4
Diesel Attack Submarines 30 4
Nuclear Attack Submarines 2 0
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Figure 2. Disposition of PLA Forces in the Nanjing Military Region
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
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It also noted the February 2012 launch of Jiangdao Class (Type 056) corvettes into the 
ECS by the PLAN, that China may build 20–30 of these to augment 60 Houbei class 
wave piercing catamaran missile patrol boats (Type 922) capable of carrying eight 
Anti-Submarine Cruise Missiles for littoral water operations. Additional ECS relevant 
report assessments included an increase in Yuzhou Landing Patrol Docks (Type 071) 
to three; the emergence of the fourth generation J-20 stealth fighter, reaching the ability 
to fight and win regional conflicts against Taiwan by 2020 by controlling Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC) and defending ECS territorial claims, and concern that tension 
with Japan will cause the United States and other powers to seek to balance against 
China.9
2014 report coverage highlights include Beijing’s November 23, 2013 declaration 
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the ECS overlapping with parts of 
Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese ADIZs. The United States declared it did not 
recognize Beijing’s ADIZ and stated it would not affect U.S. military operations in this 
area. This report also mentioned Beijing’s development of Jiangdao class corvettes (Type 
056) with nine of these entering service in 2013 with the possible construction of an 
additional 20–30 of these vessels considered possible. This report also stressed China’s 
desire to fight and win regional conflicts, defend ECS territorial claims, including 
tension with Japan over these claims, Beijing’s desire to develop a blue water navy to 
prevent the United States and other countries from conducting operations off China’s 
coast involving conflicts with Taiwan or conflict in the ECS and SCS, and the PLAN’s 
Liaoning aircraft carrier conducting operations in the ECS. Such naval enhancement 
efforts reflect the PLAN’s desire to conduct sea control and power projection operations 
along with enhancing long-range operational capabilities.10
The 2015 report reflected an increasing emphasis on Beijing’s ECS activities 
stressing Chinese preparation for military contingencies in these waters. It revealed 
Chinese defense spending increased 9.5 percent annually in inflation-adjusted terms 
between 2005 and 2014, which it predicted would be sustained for the foreseeable 
future. This document also contented:
  …The PLA continued to improve its capabilities for theater contingencies, including: 
cruise missiles; short- and medium-range ballistic missile; high performance 
aircraft; integrated air defense; information operations; and amphibious and airborne 
assault. The PLA is developing and testing new intermediate- and medium-range 
conventional ballistic missiles, as well as long-range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise 
missiles that extend China’s operational reach, attempting to push adversary forces—
including the United States—farther from potential regional conflicts.11
This report also noted Beijing’s use of low-intensity coercion to advance its maritime 
coercion claims in the ECS with official statements and state media striving to frame 
China as reacting to “threats” to national interests from or “provocations” by external 
players; that China uses small incremental steps to increase de facto control over 
disputed territories and avoid military conflict; and that it has used punitive trade policies 
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such as tariffs, tourism restrictions, and restrictions on foreign direct investment to 
advance its claims including submitting legal claims on its ECS positions to UNCLOS 
in 2012, placing ads in internationally prominent newspapers, and restricting rare earth 
mineral exports to Japan in 2010 following a collision that year between Chinese fishing 
vessels and Japanese patrol ships. The World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled these 
Chinese restrictions were discriminatory and violated WTO rules in 2012.12
It also noted 11 additional Type 056 corvettes were launched in 2014, expressed 
concern over Beijing’s lack of transparency about its increasing military capabilities 
and ECS strategic decision-making, and admitted that Chinese behavior in the ECS and 
SCS places doubt on Beijing’s desire to maintain a stable regional periphery and may 
prompt the United States and its allies to increase their regional military capabilities 
to balance China’s increasing assertiveness in these waters. During 2013, China began 
incorporating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into military exercises conducting 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) over the ECS. Examples of UAVs 
under development include the Xianglong, Yilong, Sky Saber, and Lijian with the 
last three intended to carry precision-strike capable weapons. The Lijian, launched on 
November 21, 2013 is Beijing’s first stealthy flying wing UAV.13
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) also acquired three IL-78 Midas 
aerial refueling tankers to extend the range of fighter aircraft operating over the ECS. 
PLAN and PLAAF aircraft are participating in inter-service exercises and operations to 
enhance operational flexibility supporting strike and other aircraft in ECS, Taiwan, and 
other contingencies, and plans to add at least 30 new ships (some with helicopters) to the 
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to influence national ability to enforce maritime and natural 
resource claims, and increase CCG personnel by 25 percent.14
2016 China military power report content includes Beijing continuing to use 
maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft patrolling near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
during 2015 to challenge China’s territorial claims; a willingness to tolerate higher levels 
of tension to pursue its claims while avoiding direct and explicit confrontation with the 
United States; and Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese President Shinzo Abe 
announcing a four-point bilateral agreement in November 2014 to improve bilateral 
relations.15
This report also notes Beijing is using 60 Houbei class wave piercing guided 
missile patrol boats (Type 022) for “near seas” operations; placing primary focus on 
modernizing its anti-surface warfare assets, its cruise missile, and over-the-horizon 
capabilities; and that the Liaoning aircraft certified its first domestically trained cohort 
of operational J-15 pilots with an expected 2016 deployment. It also noted Japan has 
regularly charged China with violating a June 2008 agreement establishing equidistant 
demarcation lines from each country for resource development and an area to the north 
for jointly exploring oil and natural gas fields, and claiming that China unilaterally 
drilled beneath the demarcation line extracting reserves from Japan’s side. This report 
mentioned that an expanded fleet of Chinese civilian law enforcement vessels will give 
Beijing the ability to assert its ECS claims with greater authoritativeness.16
Carrying out these expanded ECS claims using deception is a hallmark characteristic 
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of Beijing’s geopolitical strategy as this section of the 2016 China military power report 
demonstrates:
 In historical and contemporary PLA texts, Chinese military theorists 
routinely emphasize the importance of secrecy and deception both for the 
protection of personnel and infrastructure and the concealment of sensitive 
military activities. In 2015, the Chinese press featured the PLA using a 
variety of denial and deception (D&D) methods, including camouflage, 
decoys, and satellite avoidance activities during training events to protect 
PRC forces from enemy surveillance and targeting. Key D&D principles 
identified in official PLA monographs include:
 - conforming to what the enemy expects and creating false images that 
correspond to the target’s psychological tendencies and expectations;
 - detailing pre-planning, centralized control, and operational integration to 
ensure strategic coherence at the political, diplomatic, and economic levels;
 - extensive, current, and sophisticated understanding of enemy psychology; 
predisposition, capabilities (particularly Command, Control, Computer, 
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)), 
Intentions, and location; and
 - operational flexibility, rapid response, and the ability and willingness to 
employ new D&D techniques and devices.
Contemporary writings also indicate that the Chinese view D&D as a crucial enabler of 
psychological shock and force multiplier effects during a surprise attack, allowing the 
PLA to offset the advantages of a technologically superior enemy and to reinforce its 
military superiority against weaker opponents.17
 
Congressional Reaction
As part of its Article I constitutional oversight responsibilities, the U.S. Congress 
is responsible for approving new legislation, revising existing legislation, funding 
government programs, and conducting oversight of these programs including requiring 
agencies to prepare reports on their policymaking. The ECS has become an area of 
increasing concern for Congress during the Obama Administration’s two terms. One 
way this is reflected is through legislation and resolutions introduced during two-year 
congressional sessions. During the 111th Congress (2009–2010) zero bills or resolutions 
including “East China Sea” in their text were introduced. The 112th Congress (2011–
2012) saw nine bills and resolutions introduced on the ECS with H. Res. 616 calling for 
a peaceful resolution of territorial maritime disputes in the ECS and H.R. 4310 (which 
became the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013) declaring that the sense of 
Congress is that the ECS is a vital part of the Asian maritime commons, that the United 
States acknowledges Japan’s administration over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and that 
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the United States opposes using force to resolve territorial claim problems in the ECS.18
ECS legislative proposals during the 113th Congress (2013–2014) produced 23 
bills or resolutions. These included H.R. 4495, introduced by Randy Forbes (R-VA) 
and Colleen Hanabusa (D-HI) on April 28, 2014 which sought to strengthen U.S. 
commitment to Asian-Pacific security by stressing the U.S. interests in maintaining 
freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unrestricted legal commerce. 
It warned of the intrusion of Chinese ships into Japanese territory each month since 
September 2012, including nine ships into Japanese administered territory; the unilateral 
November 23, 2012 Chinese declaration of an ADIZ; that the increasing frequency and 
assertiveness of patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and maritime 
areas and airspace increases tensions and enhances the risk of miscalculation and 
conflict. This legislation specifically called for DOD’s annual Chinese military power 
report to include information on Chinese maritime balance of force capabilities with 
those of the United States and its ECS allies.19
During the 114th Congress (2015–2016), nine bills or resolutions covering the ECS 
were introduced. S. Res. 153, introduced April 28, 2015, stressed the importance of the 
U.S.-Japan relationship in safeguarding global security and prosperity; emphasized U.S. 
acknowledgement of Japan’s control over the Senkaku Islands; stressed its opposition to 
unilateral attempts to undermine Tokyo’s administration; and reiterated U.S. adherence 
to its Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security obligations to respond to armed 
attack against Japan and its territories. S. 3509, introduced on December 6, 2016 by 
Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), proposed imposing sanctions on China for its ECS and 
SCS activities against any Chinese individual or company contributing to construction, 
development, land reclamation, or infrastructure project in these waters including 
blocking property, prohibiting visas for travel to the United States, prohibiting the U.S. 
Government Publishing Office from publishing most maps, documents, and information 
resources describing the ECS and SCS as part of Chinese territory or airspace, 
prohibiting the Defense Department from taking any action implying recognition of 
Chinese sovereignty over territory or airspace contested in Japanese administered ECS 
areas, and prohibiting foreign assistance to any country recognizing Chinese territorial 
or airspace sovereignty over the ECS or SCS.20
Section 511 of H.R. 4127, the 2016 National Intelligence Authorization Act, 
required the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a report for the congressional 
intelligence communities on U.S. intelligence community (IC) collection activities on 
the ECS and SCS; their funding and personnel levels; how the IC prioritizes and focuses 
such collection on these regions; and if there are collection and funding gaps on such 
intelligence gathering and efforts being made to resolve these problems.21 
On June 8, 2016, Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) introduced an amendment to the 
2017 defense authorization legislation requiring the Secretary of Defense to plan robust 
and regular freedom of navigation missions in the ECS. This amendment stressed that 
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate 
foreign trade, punish high seas piracies and offense against national law, and maintain 
a Navy. It also stressed the long-standing U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation 
Bert Chapman80
and free access for promoting global commerce remains “a core security interest of the 
United States.”22
Concern over ECS developments has also been periodically reflected in 
congressional committee hearings during the Obama Administration. A January 13, 2010 
House Armed Services Committee hearing saw Navy Pacific Command Commander 
Admiral Robert Willard stress Beijing’s vocal assertiveness about how their SLOC 
impact movement of their commerce, trade, and energy and how expanding PLAAF and 
PLAN capacity involves securing regional commercial interests. He also maintained 
the degree of Chinese power projection to the Asia-Pacific region and ECS remains 
uncertain.23
A joint House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on January 
14, 2014 saw Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ) criticize increased Chinese aggression in the 
ECS; emphasize how adjacent U.S. allies are struggling to maintain their sovereignty 
and protect ECS navigational rights; and that military and commercial access to ECS 
navigable waters is critical to the United States and allied countries including Japan, the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.24
Testifying at this hearing, Naval War College Professor Peter Dutton commented 
that Chinese regional maritime expansion dates back to 1840 when its domination of 
the Asian maritime system ceased due to western intervention. Dutton contended a key 
objective of Beijing’s maritime strategy involves expanding control over its Near Seas 
to acquire a level of continental control it believes necessary for enhancing its security 
interests. Dutton stressed China wants to cast doubt on Japan’s control of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands; carefully conduct operations to avoid provoking overt conflict with the 
United States; use indirect application of national interests to pivot the seaborne situation 
toward Beijing; and that its ECS ADIZ intends to control water and airspace approaching 
these islands to present a legally legitimizing case for controlling these islands.25
During an April 15, 2015 hearing, Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments praised China for enhancing its maritime services, non-navy 
Coast Guard, and other non-military surveillance services in executing lawfare for 
implementing China’s maritime and territorial claims. He also expressed concern that 
the U.S. Navy and regional allies are incapable of confronting China’s sub-conventional 
aggression and that Beijing aspires to use low-level capabilities to gain preeminence in 
competing for ECS territories. Clark also asserted the United States and its allies change 
their air defense capabilities by using smaller and shorter-range weapons to destroy 
incoming weapons closer to U.S. and allied shipping; that the United States and its allies 
should have ships capable of coercing China in coastal waters; that U.S. weapons must 
be smaller and more precise to obtain maximum firepower; and that such weaponry must 
be ship carried and airborne.26
Congressional concerns about China’s activities in the ECS have also been expressed 
during House and Senate floor debate. On June 16, 2015, House Intelligence Committee 
Chair Rep. Devin Nunes (R-CA) warned that China and Russia continue expanding their 
international spheres of influence while the United States’ global cachet diminishes. He 
proceeded to emphasize “China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea 
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and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its 
territorial waters in the next decade.”27
On May 16, 2016, various representatives, led by House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chair Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA) successfully urged passage of H. Con. Res. 88 
reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances given to Taiwan, citing 
increased Chinese military assertiveness in the ECS as key reasons for this legislation. 
The Six Assurances included in this legislation are:
•    The United States will not set a date for terminating arms sales to Taiwan.
• The United States sees no mediation for it between Taiwan and China.
• The United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with China.
• There is no change in the U.S. position on Taiwanese sovereignty.
• The United States has no plans to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
•  The United States will not engage in prior consultation with China on arms sales 
to Taiwan.28
Analysis
These annual DOD reports and regularly issued congressional documents, along 
with other U.S. Government and military reports, stress various aspects of Beijing’s 
increasing assertiveness in the ECS including emphasizing these waters military 
operational environment. An area stressed in such reports is the increasing importance 
of China’s growing cruise missile arsenal and how it will use Anti-Access Aerial Denial 
(A2AD) efforts to increase the costs to the United States and its allies of militarily 
intervening in the ECS to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and attempts to press its 
claims toward the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese cruise missiles could be used to 
threaten hardened Taiwanese aircraft fortifications including cave entrances to Taipei’s 
underground fighter shelters inside a mountain at Cha Shan Airbase on Taiwan’s east 
side, destroy command and control nodes which would coordinate and intercept PRC air 
attacks, and such missiles could be used to destroy Taiwanese aircraft and airfields.29
An ECS conflict involving China and the United States is likely to see the PLAN 
engaging in multi-axis cruise missile attacks against U.S. carrier strike groups and their 
Aegis air defense perimeters with a variety of cruise missiles and launching platforms 
making it difficult to implement effective defenses against these missiles. According to 
a PLA official at the Nanjing Military Region Headquarters, Beijing would use surprise 
attacks to weaken the supporting capabilities of U.S. and allied military bases, obstruct 
and interfere with enemy aircraft carrier battle groups, and frighten forces taking part in 
military operations against China.30
Any ECS military conflict will see China using the full spectrum of its combat 
operational capabilities including fast attack aircraft; attacks against U.S. underwater 
telecommunications assets; antisubmarine warfare; coastal artillery; gaining Near Seas 
aerospace and naval superiority; using counterstrike doctrine to prevent Taiwanese 
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independence and threatening U.S. Western Pacific-based forces and bases; enhancing 
its potential ECS control using its C4ISR capabilities including integrating aerospace 
combat capabilities; and making it increasingly difficult and costly for the United States 
and its allies to respond to Beijing’s strategic ambitions.31
The ECS is considered one of the Near Seas (Jinhai) maritime areas between China 
and the First Island Chain stretching from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Strait of Malacca. It 
is an important shipping lane for China; part of the Beijing’s claimed territorial waters; 
and a locale where it confronts the U.S.-Japan security alliance. These near seas are 
viewed by Chinese thinkers as the originating point for over 170 years of “humiliation” 
by foreign maritime powers, and represent the inherited historical concept of maritime 
defense (haifeng). Such thinking heavily influences Beijing’s assertiveness and will 
require the United States and its allies to change their military doctrine to disable 
Chinese integrated air defense systems (IADS) and update the Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine, such as the Joint Publication 3-01 Countering and Missile 
Threats, to meet air defense requirements in an A2AD environment.32
Beijing and Washington have made some efforts to mitigate possible conflict in 
the ECS and adjacent maritime waters. On February 29, 2008, a treaty establishing a 
secure defense telephone link between these two countries was signed in Shanghai. This 
mechanism is located at China’s Zhongnanhai Telecommunications Directorate and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Defense Office in Beijing and in the United States’ 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Communications. This link’s purpose is to provide 
for official exchanges between the Chinese Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense and these exchanges will be protected by encryption devices and may not be 
disclosed to third parties without the other country’s written consent. Provisions of this 
agreement include the country requesting a call providing 48 hours’ advance notice, 
specifying discussion topics, and using appropriate diplomatic and military channels for 
the call. Topics to be covered through such contacts include emergencies between U.S. 
and Chinese armed forces, major events regarding these militaries, and important topics 
concerning U.S.-China military-to-military exchange programs.33
On November 9–10, 2014 the United States and China signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) covering behavior safety rules for air and maritime encounters.
MOU provisions included it not being binding under international law; both countries’ 
defense departments conducting an annual assessment meeting led by a senior colonel 
or captain level officer or their civilian equivalents to review previous year events 
concerning application of these behavioral rules, and consulting on their potential 
revision and future improvements. The agenda for these annual meetings must be 
proposed and set at least four weeks in advance and the memorandum does not affect 
each side’s rights or obligations under international agreements, customary international 
law, and does not prejudice Beijing or Washington’s policy perspective on EEZ military 
activities.34
MOU provisions also include that military vessels encountering each other at 
sea must ensure navigation safety with active communications and coordinated 
actions. The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
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at Sea (COLREGS), International Code of Signals (ICS), Radio Regulations of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Standard Maritime Communication 
Phrases (SMCP), and Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) serve as the 
foundational basis for military vessel communication and contact.35
Additional MOU provisions include both sides’ military vessels being required to 
maintain a safe distance from each other under CUES; commanding officers of ships 
conducting activities that may affect adjacent military vessels and aircraft must establish 
appropriate warning or warning areas; maintaining timely and active communications 
with nearby aircraft or vessels to coordinate their actions and ensure safety; vessels 
should avoid dangerous approaches and situations capable of producing misperception 
and miscalculation; and damage control and life-saving measures should be taken if 
collision occurs to avoid situational escalation.
In the case of air-to-air encounters, both sides’ military aircraft should ensure safe 
separation to avoid creating a safety hazard if an unintentional flight encounter occurs; 
both sides’ pilots are to operate with professional airmanship and consideration for the 
other side’s aircraft when intentionally approaching another country’s military aircraft 
for escort, identification, or verification purposes; military aircraft and vessels should 
avoid interfering with activities established or declared by the other side, though the 
vessels of the non-declaring country enjoy freedom of navigation and over-flight rights; 
military aircraft pilots should avoid taking action such as using lasers to harm personnel 
or damage equipment on counterpart military aircraft; interfere with launch and recovery 
of military aircraft by the other side’s military vessel; engage in aerobatics or simulated 
attacks in the vicinity of encountered vessels; and not discharge signal rockets, weapons, 
or other objects in the direction of encountered military vessels or aircraft unless there is 
a case of distress.36
Conclusion
DOD’s annual report on Chinese military power is one of the most important and 
publicly accessible sources for understanding how DOD views Chinese security 
developments in the ECS in response to congressional oversight efforts. It and 
companion publications from other DOD entities such as National Defense University, 
the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, Army War College’s Strategic 
Studies Institute, Air University Press, and congressional armed services and foreign 
affairs oversight committees provide insightful analysis of Chinese ECS activities 
and the potential implications of these activities for U.S. strategic interests for those 
interested in understanding the significance of developments in this region.37
The ability of the U.S. military and the willingness of U.S. policymakers to respond 
to Chinese assertiveness in these waters is limited by the United States’ acute budget 
deficit estimated at $623.804 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, and national debt of 
$19.976.827 trillion as of December 31, 2016. These factors, coupled with reduced 
defense spending from $667.557 billion in FY 2009 to $590.577 billion in FY 2017 has 
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adversely impacted the military’s ability to implement the Obama Administration’s Pivot 
to the Pacific and maintain U.S. military strength. This is demonstrated by one analysis 
of sequestration’s impact on defense spending, saying the FY 2015 defense budget 
is insufficient to meet the defense program advocated in the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, including not funding requisite 
Army and Marine Corps strength and naval aircraft carrier levels, that an additional 
$200–$300 billion is needed to fund military programs outlined in DOD’s Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP), and that there is insufficient funding for the ballistic missile 
defense program which would be crucial in any ECS-focused military scenarios.38 
Public opinion on supporting increased defense spending and views of whether China 
is a security threat to the United States presents an ambivalent picture making it difficult 
to tangibly augment U.S. military assets in this region to advance Washington’s interests 
and those of our allies. An April 2016 Pew Center poll asking whether China was a 
major threat, minor threat, or nonexistent threat to the United States saw 50 percent of 
respondents saying it was a major threat; 34 percent a minor threat; 12 percent saying 
it was not a threat, and three percent saying they did not know or refused to answer. A 
poll conducted by this organization during April 2016 on public attitudes toward defense 
spending revealed 35 percent favored increasing defense spending, 40 percent favoring 
maintaining existing spending levels, 24 percent favoring reducing defense spending, 
and two percent saying they did not know or refused to answer.39
Tangible demonstration of declining U.S. military readiness and capabilities 
to deal with strategic contingencies in the ECS and elsewhere is provided in the 
Heritage Foundation’s 2016 and 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength. These annual 
compilations note the ongoing nature of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, assess that China 
is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike options, and is likely to begin 
seaborne nuclear deterrence patrols in the near future. It also maintains that Japan, the 
Philippines, and Taiwan face increasing military, paramilitary, and political pressure from 
China. This document also comments that robust Chinese conventional ballistic missile 
capabilities give Beijing the ability to counter land forces, aircraft, and ships (including 
U.S. aircraft carriers) in its immediate area with some of these weapons having ranges 
of up to 3,300 kilometers. These PLA forces seek to deter U.S. intervention in support of 
regional allies by endangering key U.S. platforms and systems including aircraft carriers 
consequently enabling Beijing to achieve de facto dominance of the ECS. Such military 
capabilities are enhanced by a tripartite strategy of lawfare, public opinion warfare, and 
psychological warfare striving to undermine Taiwan’s will to resist and U.S. willingness 
to support Taipei. Heritage concludes that China is an aggressive and high threat to U.S. 
vital interests, with high being the second highest ranking on a continuum ranging from, 
and including, low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe.40
This report also stressed its concerns about the deleterious effects sequestration and 
other budget reductions have had on U.S. military readiness and capabilities. Army 
recommended capabilities for a two major regional conflict scenario are 50 brigade 
combat teams with the Army’s actual 2015 level being 32 brigade combat teams. 
Concerns about U.S. military power are reflected in the following table.
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Table 3. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength41
U.S. 







This report also issued troubling ratings to individual U.S. armed service branches as 
the following tables demonstrate with the Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Navy being 
most likely to participate in ECS military operations:
Heritage’s assessment also stressed concern at the difference in the Navy’s ship 
inventory, with its January 2015 stated fleet requirement report to Congress documented 
in the following table
Table 4. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Army42
U.S. Military 





Table 5. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Navy43
U.S. Military 






Table 6. Difference in the Navy’s Ship Inventory44








Aircraft Carriers 10 11 10 -1
Large Surface Combatant 84 88 84 -4
Small Surface Combatant 17 52 17 -35
Attack Submarines 54 48 52 +4
Cruise Missile Submarines 4 0 4 +2
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 14 12 14 +2
Amphibious Warfare Ships 31 34 31 -3
Combat Logistics Force 30 29 30 -1
Total 271 308 272 -36
Table 7. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Air Force45
U.S. Military 





Table 8. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Marine Corps46
U.S. Military 
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U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft requirements for a two major regional conflict scenario are 
1,200 aircraft, with actual 2015 inventory being 1,113 aircraft. The Air Force’s overall 
military power ratings are:
Marine Corps force structure recommendations for two major regional conflicts are 
36 battalions, with the actual 2015 total being 23 battalions. The Corps overall military 
power ratings are:
Military conflict in the ECS involving China and North Korea could result in escalation 
to using nuclear weapons. The Heritage Foundation also stresses concern about the 
United States’ ability to use its nuclear deterrent if such a contingency occurs as the 
following ratings demonstrate:
Events in the ECS are important because China is pursuing a grand strategy 
seeking to end U.S. primacy in Asia and altering the regional balance of power using 
military modernization, geoeconomics, and lawfare in an attempt to achieve de facto 
Finlandization of adjoining countries to Beijing’s policies. While there is debate over 
whether comity will remain in Sino-U.S. relations or whether war between China 
and the United States is inevitable, the potential for conflict cannot be dismissed as 
improbable due to conditions documented in DOD’s annual military reports on China 
and other publications.48
Table 9. 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Nuclear47
U.S. Military 

















The United States must mitigate its fiscal problems by reforming its unsustainable 
entitlement and inefficient tax programs to equip the military with the assets necessary 
to deter and defeat potential military aggression from Islamist terrorism, Russian 
assertiveness, and Chinese assertiveness in the Western Pacific. Although U.S. defense 
spending remains preeminent by global standards, it has failed to keep up with inflation 
and increasing weapons costs while declining as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) from 5.5 percent in the 1980s to 2.8 percent in 2016 and a projected 
2.5 percent in 2020, and 25.9 percent of the U.S. Government in 1985 to an estimated 
14.2 percent in 2017.The United States’ ability to confront aggression in the ECS and 
elsewhere will also be hampered by projected military force personnel reductions from 
2,127,000 in 2015 to 2,071,000 (3 percent) in 2020.
Examples of the assets the military needs to confront Beijing’s aggressiveness 
include dealing with Chinese sub-conventional aggression, altering air defense 
capabilities by using smaller and shorter range weapons to destroy incoming weapons 
approaching U.S. and allied shipping, that the United States and its allies must have 
ships capable of coercing China in coastal waters comparable to what Beijing has done 
to Japanese and Philippine ships, that U.S. weapons should be smaller and more precise 
to acquire maximum firepower, and that such weapons should be ship carried and 
airborne.49
It is imperative for the incoming Trump Administration, DOD, and Congress to 
explicitly incorporate funding for an assertive ECS and the Pivot to the Pacific into 
future budgets for entities such as Pacific Command (PACOM), joint and individual 
armed service doctrinal and national security strategic documents, and for national 
leaders to repeatedly educate Americans and the international community on the 
increasing danger posed to U.S. and allied economic and strategic interests by 
China’s aggression. Comparable levels of national leadership and sustained political 
communication are required for educating domestic and international opinion about 
the necessity of sustained U.S. and allied financial personnel support for the European 
Reassurance Initiative and ongoing operations against the Islamic State.50
Japan’s July 11, 2016 election giving Prime Minister Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party 
more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats could produce a revocation of Japan’s 
constitutional war prohibition clause and enhance Tokyo’s military power potential. 
It is possible this may produce increased tensions between China and Japan. The July 
12, 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision ruling in favor of the Philippines 
against China’s expansive SCS territorial claims could be a potentially helpful precedent 
deterring China from engaging in aggressive geopolitical aspirations in the ECS. It 
remains to be seen whether this legal setback, which cannot be enforced, will restrain 
Beijing or embolden it to continue pursuing irredentist objectives in either of these 
strategically important waterways.51
DOD publications such as its annual report on Chinese military power can provide 
useful information to individuals concerned with international security developments 
about how Chinese assertiveness in the ECS and adjacent waters could jeopardize 
international trade and security, core U.S. and allied economic and strategic interests, and 
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require assertive and sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and political responses 
by the United States and its allies to ensure that China does not gain de facto hegemony 
over the Western Pacific.
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